Abstract. Securing JavaScript in the browser is an open and challenging problem. Code from pervasive third-party JavaScript libraries exacerbates the problem because it is executed with the same privileges as the code that uses the libraries. An additional complication is that the different stakeholders have different interests in the security policies to be enforced in web applications. This paper focuses on securing JavaScript code by inlining security checks in the code before it is executed. We achieve great flexibility in the deployment options by considering security monitors implemented as security-enhanced JavaScript interpreters. We propose architectures for inlining security monitors for JavaScript: via browser extension, via web proxy, via suffix proxy (web service), and via integrator. Being parametric in the monitor itself, the architectures provide freedom in the choice of where the monitor is injected, allowing to serve the interests of the different stake holders: the users, code developers, code integrators, as well as the system and network administrators. We report on experiments that demonstrate successful deployment of a JavaScript information-flow monitor with the different architectures.
Introduction
JavaScript is at the heart of what defines the modern browsing experience on the web. JavaScript enables dynamic and interactive web pages. Glued together, JavaScript code from different sources provides a rich execution platform. Reliance on third-party code is pervasive [32] , with the included code ranging from format validation snippets, to helper libraries such as jQuery, to helper services such as Google Analytics, and to fully-fledged services such as Google Maps and Yahoo! Maps.
Securing JavaScript Securing JavaScript in the browser is an open and challenging problem. Third-party code inclusion exacerbates the problem. The same-origin policy (SOP), enforced by the modern browsers, allows free communication to the Internet origin of a given web page, while it places restrictions on communication to Internet domains outside the origin. However, once third-party code is included in a web page, it is executed with the same privileges as the code that uses the libraries. This gives rise to a number of attack possibilities that include location hijacking, behavioral tracking, leaking cookies, and sniffing browsing history [21] .
Security policy stakeholders An additional complication is that the different stakeholders have different interests in the security policies to be enforced in web applications.
Users might demand stronger guarantees than those offered by SOP when it is not desired that sensitive information leaves the browser. This makes sense in popular web applications such as password-strength checkers and loan calculators. Code developers clearly have an interest in protecting the secrets associated with the web application. For example, they might allow access to the first-party cookie for code from third-party services, like Google (as needed for the proper functioning of such services as Google Analytics), but under the condition that no sensitive part of the cookie is leaked to the third party. Code integrators might have different levels of trust to the different integrated components, perhaps depending on the origin. It makes sense to invoke different protection mechanisms for different code that is integrated into the web application. For example, an e-commerce web site might include jQuery from a trusted web site without protection, while it might load advertisement scripts with protection turned on. Finally, system and network administrators also have a stake in the security goals. It is often desirable to configure the system and/or network so that certain users are protected to a larger extent or communication to certain web sites is restricted to a larger extent. For example, some Internet Service Providers, like Comcast, inject JavaScript into the users' web traffic but so far only to display browser notifications for sensitive alerts 1 .
Secure inlining for JavaScript This paper proposes a novel approach to securing JavaScript in web applications in the presence of different stakeholders. We focus on securing JavaScript code by inlining security checks in the code before it is executed. A key feature of our approach is focusing on security monitors implemented, in JavaScript, as security-enhanced JavaScript interpreters. This, seemingly bold, approach achieves two-fold flexibility. First, having complete information about a given execution, securityenhanced JavaScript interpreters are able to enforce such fine-grained security policies as information-flow security [37] . Second, because the monitor/interpreter is itself written in JavaScript, we achieve great flexibility in the deployment options.
Architectures for inlining security monitors As our main contribution, we propose architectures for inlining security monitors for JavaScript: via browser extension, via web proxy, via suffix proxy (web service), and via integrator. While the code extension and proxy techniques themselves are well known, their application to security monitor deployment is novel. Being parametric in the monitor itself, the architectures provide freedom in the choice of where the monitor is injected, allowing to serve the interests of the different stake holders: users, code developers, code integrators, as well as system and network administrators. We note that our approach is general: it applies to arbitrary security monitors, implemented as JavaScript interpreters. The Narcissus [13] project provides a baseline JavaScript interpreter written in JavaScript, an excellent starting point for supporting versatile security policies.
Our evaluation of the architectures explores the relative security considerations. When introducing reference monitoring, Anderson [3] identifies the following principles: (i) the monitor must be tamperproof (monitor integrity), (ii) the monitor must be always invoked (complete mediation) [39] , and (iii) the monitor must be small enough to be
